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unaccustomed role and calls for the need for more empirical research on settlement quality to help
judges evaluate negotiated outcomes. A recently completed study by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice is
suggested as a model for fulfilling this research need in Canada. The article's focus is comparative and
Canadian, drawing on legislation and case law in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia.
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Oftentimes our business has been rather to quarry and hew for some builder of the future
than to leave a finished building.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

The class action is society's modern tool for formulating,
crystallizing, and resolving large-scale civil disputes. It uniquely combines
elements of legislated dispute processing, individual incentive, and judicial
discretion over key aspects of the process-including the discretion to grant
or withhold approval of settlements that can affect the rights and remedies
of hundreds or thousands of citizens. The class action thereby presents a
distinct alternative to traditional litigation that makes it apt for studying in
an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) framework. Despite the
voluminous literature on class actions and even greater volume of ADR
scholarship, relatively little has been said about the confluence of the two
methods. Any attempt to make such a link raises questions, if not eyebrows.
What is it about the class action that makes it an "alternative" and to what,
precisely, is it an alternative? What are the promises and potential of class
actions and how well are they fulfilled in practice? When is a class action
preferable to another procedure for resolving mass disputes and when is it
not? These are the essential questions considered in this article. The
answers, tentative as they are, may go some way to finding a greater niche
for class actions within the world of ADR; and in the process, help ADR
continue to redefine and reinvent itself.
II.

THE ADR CONTEXT: DISPUTING ALONG A COMMANDCONSENSUS SPECTRUM

At its most basic level, ADR theory and practice contrasts a world
in which disputes are processed by "rights talk" with a world of disputing
based on party interests. The latter, implicitly or explicitly, is seen as the

I Sir F. Pollock& F.W. Maitland, TheHistoiyof English Law, 2d ed. (Cambridge: University Press,
1952) excerpt from preface to first edition.
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alternative to the former. The paradigm for "rights talk" is adjudication,
typically in a courtroom, but also includes arbitration." The common
attribute of litigation and arbitration is that someone impartial3 decides the
dispute. The decision maker usually makes a determination by reference to
a set of rights or duties, and by applying a body of rules or precedents.
However, in both litigation and arbitration, the process may be subsumed
under a notion that the judge or arbitrator can be guided simply by a
generalized sense of fairness The result is closure, at least on the specific
dispute, if not on the conflict that gave rise to it.' There is a clear winner
and loser, more or less; though it is said: "go to law for a sheep and lose
your cow." 6
The paradigm for the world of party interests is negotiation.
Preferably, ADR is principled, focused on interests7 rather than positions,
and sometimes includes assistance from a neutral party, as in mediationY
Depending on the mediator, the third party's role can be either purely
facilitative or evaluative.9 Agreements, not decisions, are the sought-for

2 In one view, arbitration is a form of ADR; in another, it is simply a form of adjudication, vith
all other processes being cast as alternatives, that is, alternatives to adjudieation generally.
3 Contrast this with some sstems, such as labour arbitration, %hich make deliberate

us-, of
"biased" representatives of the disputants, that is. panel members dravn from both labaur and
management.
4
For an arbitral award based solely on fairness, sceA&icurazianiGencrallS.P-4. %-Strnceu
Erc
Group,[19961 O.J.No. 4456 (Gen. Div.), online: QL (OJ). %,herethe arbitrator applied custom of the
trade by analogy to a novel stuation; leave to appeal denied. In the judicial rcalmec eg.Re3fDanld
(1972), 1 O.R. 363 (H.C.), where the trustee in bankruptcy %,asnot entitled to rely on a strict legal
position as it would be inconsistent with natural justice to depnve the decascd'sundischargcd bankrupt
estate of insurance monies by reason of his failure to repay nominal balance needed to complete his
discharge.
To the extent a difference exists, disputing is probably the narro;.cr concept; conflict,
the
broader. Disputes may be one-off or synptomatic of structural conflict. Cn'eriely , ecific dtputes,
when multiplied, unresolved, or escalated, transform to dceper. long.term conflict. On conflict and its
7
transformation, see e-g. J.Z. Rubin, D.G. Pruitt and SM. Kim,
C
h1t Es alatwn, Stalcmate and
Settlement, 2d ed. (New York' McGraw-Hill, 1994).
6R. Fergusson, The Factson FileDictionan of Prova's(New York- Facts on File,
1933)
7See R. Fisher, W.Ury & B. Patton, Getingto Yes: NcSotiatng.4grcnmcnt Ifhut Git ing
In, 2d
ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1991).
See eg. J.Macfarlane, "The Mediation Alternative" in J,Macfarlane, cd., Rcihmtir' Dra.s'c
The MediationAltenative (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1O971.
9 See L Riskin,"Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies and Techniques:
A Grid for
the Perplexed" (1996) 1 Harv. Negotiation L Rev. 7.
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result. Although typically "most cases settle,"10 there is no guarantee of
closure. If all goes well, the agreement may even be a wise one," with the
parties expanding the pie through integrative bargaining 2 and achieving a
win-win outcome in place of the win-lose one that, so the theory goes, they
would have obtained through adjudication.
Those who have thought much about disputing see the
ingenuousness of this ADR Weltanschauung. Therefore we need to sketch
in some refinements and add some experience to this approach.
The first refinement is that we are talking about rationaldispute
resolution processes, not irrational ones like chance, a ordeal, t4 or trial by
battle. 5 We discount irrational techniques as arbitrary and unmodern,
sometimes forgetting that not long ago they were the chief means of
resolving disputes and, to an extent, continue to exert their influence. One
might well ask whether the oft-heard negotiating refrain---"let's split the

J0 See M. Galanter & M. Cahill, "'Most Cases Settle': Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements" (1993-94) 46 Stan. L Rev. 1339, showing, in part, that why this is so in any particular case
eludes robust answers, and noting generally the difficulty of measuring settlement quality.
11 Fisher & Ury, supra note
7.
12 Ibid. See also the rich literature on bargaining and game theory, in particular, the more
accessible treatment by R. D. Luce & H. Raiffa, Games andDecisions: Introductionand CriticalReview
(New York: Dover, 1989). At the risk of over-simplification, the basic idea is that positional negotiating
is akin to a zero-sum distributive game, with payoffs structured so that one player's loss is the other's
gain. Principled negotiation, by contrast, emulates a variable-sum integrative game in which payoffs vary
because of the presence of multiple issues that players value differently, creating opportunities for
mutual gain.
13 D.P. Emond, "Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Conceptual Overview" in D.P.
Emond, ed.,
Commercial Dispute Resolution: Alternatives to Litigation (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1989) 17.
Professor Emond notes that probabilistic techniques such as the coin toss may be acceptable to
disputants who are indifferent or uncertain about the preferred result, or where the dispute is small
enough to be amenable to a fast method of deciding it.
14 Ordeal puts a spin on chance by incorporating a belief that the outcome
reflects supernatural
judgement, which always ensures that right triumphs. Ordeal by fire or water was once a common
method of truth-finding and is still practised in one form or another in parts of the world. The practice
of dunking a suspected miscreant was based on the notion that water, as the medium of baptism, would
"receive" the innocent and "reject," or buoy, the guilty. See Pollock & Maitland, supra note I at 598ff.
See also The New EncyclopaediaBritannica, 15th ed., (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1997) s.v.
"Ordeal".
15
Trial by battle, a variant on ordeal, was judicially adopted in England in the 11th century,
in part
because ordeal by fire or water left too much to chance or clerical manipulation. A judge would order
accuser and accused to duel under conditions as to place, time and arms, requiring them to deposit
sureties for their appearance. The loser, if still alive after the battle, was dealt with according to law.
England did not formally abolish the system until 1819. See Pollock and Maitland, ibid. See also The
New EncyclopaediaBritannica, ibid., s.v. "Duel."
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difference"--is little more than a variation on the coin toss; orwhether the
use of brute physical strength to resolve civil cases, including the use of
professional fighters,1 6 has only been superseded by a modern correlative;
financial strength and the use of professional advocates to overwhelm
litigants whose resources are weaker than their claims. 17 But we make and
appreciate this distinction, at least in part because it renders dispute
resolution more amenable to study, analyze and classify.
The second refinement is that we can better understand dispute
resolution processes by situating them on a spectrum or continuum, rather
than in one camp or another of a neat rights-interest dichotomy. The
spectrum may have several axes,"3 but one of the more useful models is the
"command-consensus" axis that classifies processes by degree of party
control and susceptibility to public scrutiny.
As depicted by Paul Emond, t9 the spectrum's leftmost end has a
high degree of party control with few, if any, predetermined limits on
procedure, participation, or outcome. It is consensual, private, and
confidential. The private negotiation and settlement of most civil disputes
falls in this category. Moving to the right on the spectrum are conciliation
and mediation,2° where at least some control, typically over process rather
than outcome, is surrendered to another person. At this point the spectrum
takes on a more public hue, particularly if the mediator is governmentappointed or court-annexed. Further to the right lies the adjudicative
processes, with their emphasis on decisions rather than agreements. Even
here, spectra lie within the spectrum. Arbitration, for example, usually
allows for much party control over who decides the case; court-based
adjudication allows for relatively little control. Outcome confidentiality is
typical in arbitration,2 but atypical in a court case." However, in both

See The New Encyclopeadia Britannica,ibid.
17 See Emond, supra note 13 at 17.
iEs amples include: speed, cost, fleibility, degree of legal precilon, precedential value, and
finality.
19

See Emond, supra note 13, in particular the graphical representation at 21.
20 Conciliation is generally seen as more passtie than mediation, v, th one defintin of a
conciliator beingsomeone w.ho "flattens the barriers'standing in thevayof agrcementby, forcvample,
providing a neutral forum for negotiations and transmitting positions and concef::ions to and from the
parties, A mediator, by contrast, tends to play a more active role by refraining, paoitions to szekjoint
gains, and by achieving and keeping momentum in the negotiations. See Emond, bJ, at 19.
21 That is, typical when conducted pursuant to an arbitratton agreement, v,here the agreement
itself provides for confidentiality. No such limitation is vritten into arbitral te'%ts such as the Unfenn
ArbitrationAct, online: Uniform La, Conference of Canada Homepage <http:.#vn,w;.ulce.ca>. vhih
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processes, negotiation usually proceeds on a parallel track "in the shadow
of the law,"' typically resulting in a settlement that is consensual and
confidential. At the rightmost end of the spectrum, we move into the
regulatory and administrative arena, with a high emphasis on public
scrutiny and accountability. Then, ultimately, into rule-making by majority
vote. At this stage, dispute processing is highly public, its contour shaped
by the legislature, as in the case of workers' compensation or no-fault
automobile insurance regimes. Outcomes are driven by interests, yet can
result in widespread abrogation of right? or the creation of new rights and
new causes of action."5
These refinements reveal ADR as multi-hued, offering more than
just an alternative to litigation.' One can choose one's process like paints
from a richly coloured palette; even mixing different colours to create new,
hybrid processes. The aim of this flexible approach is to resolve disputes in
the manner most appropriate to the parties or the dispute at hand.' Hence
the moniker, preferred by some, of "appropriate dispute resolution,"
''
though the emergent trend is to drop the "A" altogether and call it "DR. 2
Moreover, the discipline of dispute resolution is shown as worthy of critical

serves as a model for domestic arbitration statutes.
22 On the relative merits of arbitration and litigation and some thoughts on melding the best
features of each, see D. Jiang-Schuerger, "Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration + Litigation?" (1999) 4
Harv.Negotiation L Rev. 231.
23
The expression comes from R.H. Mnookin & L.Kornhauser, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce" (1979) 88 Yale LJ.950 referring to the ways in which court rules and
procedures affect the bargaining that occurs between parties outside court.
24 For example, workers' compensation was once seen as radical because it took away tort law
rights of workers and employers. In hindsight, the legislation can be viewed as a social compact in which
workers gave up common law rights to sue employers for workplace accidents in exchange for relative
certainty about theirability to claim and obtain benefitsbecause of those accidents. Similarly, employers
gave up common law defences such as contributory negligence in exchange for reducing their exposure
for damages, the cost of the trade-off being an annual premium passed on to consumers in the price of
the employers' products.
25 See e.g. Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373, creating a statutory tort, violation of privacy,
actionable without proof of damage.
26
See R.A.B. Bush, "Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies
of Quality Arguments" (1989) 66 Deny. U.L Rev. 335.
27See F. Sander & S.B. Goldberg, "Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: a User-Friendly Guide to
Selecting an ADR Procedure" (1994) Negotiation J. 49.
28As does the first Canadian casebook on the subject. See J. Macfarlane, Dispute Resolution:
Readings and Case Studies (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1999).
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study in its own right, as well as a lens through which other disciplines can
be examined.
III. CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: A CASE OF LEMONS PROVIDES
CRITICAL MASS
This is the context and the lens in vhich this article seeks to situate
and study class actions. The three Canadian jurisdictions with class
proceedings legislation (Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia) 3 crafted

the legislation to supplement, not supplant, ordinary litigation. They

enacted the laws because the rules of court allowing representative actions3 '
were "totally inadequate" for resolving mass disputes in a consumer society.
At least, so said the Supreme Court of Canada in Naken v. GeneralMotors
of CanadaLtd 2 when some 4500 Vauxhall Firenza ovmers sued General
Motors (GMi) for defects in their cars. The Firenza purportedly resembled
a certain sour yellow fruit, with a litany of defects alleged in the brakes,
steering, fuel line, transmission, and universal joints. The owners sought
$1000 each for excessive depreciation. The Ontario Court of Appeal
thought the dispute could be tried on that basis, but on further appeal,
Justice Estey accepted GM's submission that individual hearings would be
needed to determine the circumstances of each purchase and each owner's
entitlement to damages. The Court candidly acknowledged that the
engineering and market evidence required to prove the case would be so

costly as to mean, practically, the end to many claims; but it thought this

29 The term "classproceedings" is broad enough to o erboth actions and applications.
H;ver,
as most proceedings are started byway of action, "class actions" is the more popular term.
30

The key legislative provisions are as follows: in Quebec, AnAc ReT-ccing the CssAction, .Q.
1978, c. 8, now Book IX of the Code of Ciil Procedure [hereinafter Q.C.C.P.]; in Ontario, Class
ProceedingsAct,1992,S.O. 1992, c. 6 [hereinafter O.C.PA.]; and in British Columbia, C1/assPra-cc'Lnms
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 [hereinafter B.C.C.P.A.]. The legislation, with related statutes, iscollected in
W.K.Branch, ClassActionsin Canada,looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada LawBook, 201) and in AA
Eizenga etal., ClassActionsLawandPractice,looseleaf(Markham, Ont.: Butterwvorth-s 1939). S- also
the Uniform Class Proceedings Act, online: Uniform Law Conference of Canada Homepage.
<http:IAwwv.ulcc.ca> [hereinafter U.C.P.A.], adopted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada. As
this article vasgoing to press, two other provinces, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland, hadenacted clas.;
action statutes and were in the process of implementing them.
31 Each province has a rule derived from Rule 10 of the Rules of Pj'ccedure, a schedule to the
Supreme Court of JudicatureAct, 1873 (U.K.), 36 & 37 Vict,, c.66. Rule 10 -says ' [vhere there are
numerous parties having the same interest in one action, one or more ... may sue or be sued, or may
be authorised by the Court to defend in such action, on behalf of or for the benefit of all paies so
interested"
32 (1933), 144 D.LR. (3d) 3S5 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Na xn].
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was a matter "more fittingly the subject of scrutiny in the legislative rather
than the judicial chamber." 33
The legislature took the hint and looked east and south for ideas.
Quebec, after all, had legislation governing the recourscollectifsince1979, 4
and even a government agency to which claimants could apply for funding.35
The modern U.S. federal class action rule, Rule 23,36 had been in effect
since 1966, and the content that judges had given it through interpretation
offered a wealth of experience to draw on.37 The Ontario Law Reform
Commission (oLRc) had also been looking at mass disputes for a while, and
published an exhaustive report at approximately the same time as the
Naken decision was released. 8
The Commission concluded that class proceedings legislation would
go a long way to fulfilling three key principles. The first principle was
access to justice. By pooling claims, individuals and entities"'whose injuries
or losses would be too small to justify litigation could obtain cost-effective
remedies. Secondly, they considered the principle of judicial economy.
Class actions can reduce the court's burden of having to deal with large
numbers of claims, as well as the risk of reaching inconsistent decisions.
Behaviour modification was the third principle considered. The threat of
large damage awards can impel corporate and institutional defendants to
internalize the social costs of their activities, including the costs of wrongful

33 Ibid. at 407. The Supreme Court of Canada recently revisited the Naken decision in Western
CanadianShopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534. The case had been brought in Alberta,
aprovince without class action legislation, pursuant to the representative rules of Court. The question,
as in Naken, was whether it could proceed in this way. The Court stated that in the absence of
comprehensive legislation, courts must fill the void under their inherent power to settle the rules of
practice and procedure as to disputes brought before them. The Court set out a number of criteria for
engaging in this gap-filling exercise, and justified it on the basis that, since Naken, the importance of the
class action as a procedural tool in modern litigation "has become manifest."
34 Q.C.C.P.,supra note

30.

Le fonds d'aide aux recours collectifs, established pursuant to An Act Respecting the Class
Action, R.S.Q. c. R-2.1, ss. 5-45.
36 Promulgated at 383 US 1029. Most states also allow class actions, some having adopted Rule
23 mutatis mutandis.

37 For an exhaustive review of United States class action law, see H.B. Newberg & A. Conic,
Newberg on ClassActions, 3d ed. (Rochester: Lawyer's Cooperative, 1992).
38
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on ClassActions (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney
General, 1982) [hereinafter OLRC Report].
39 InQuebec, only natural persons can start or take part in class actions. See Q.C.C.P., supra note
30, art. 999. No such restriction applies in Ontario or British Columbia.
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behaviour that would otherwise be spread over a diffuse class!' The
Commission acknowledged the arguments against class actions including
floodgates, legalized blackmail, and manageability concerns. The
Commission concluded that the empirical evidence showed little basis for
worry and determined that overall, the benefits would outweigh the
burdens.4'
The three principles bear some comment, because each class action
jurisdiction has drawn on them, both in drafting the legislation and in
judicially interpreting it. The first principle, access to justice, shows that the
class action can be seen as much as an alternative to avoidance as an
alternative to traditional litigation.!2 Undoubtedly, the stuff of some class4
actions-a bank's failure to clearly explain mortgage prepayment terms, '
lost student class time due to a university faculty strike," a municipality's
neglect to eliminate ragweed 45 -may, for many, never reach the status of a
perceived injurious experience, or PIE, in ADR jargon.4 For others, the
injury may be named, a culprit blamed, but a claim never made47 because
its pursuit is likely to cost too much in relation to the expected relief.
Avoidance is also not an unknown phenomenon in the management of our
corporate and public institutions. Thus, a faulty product, a poor service, or
an incorrect charge that systematically disfavours a member of the public
goes uncorrected as long as not too much fuss is made about it.
Enter class counsel. By setting up a regime that rewards
entrepreneurial lawyers on the basis of risks taken, an incentive is created

40 Foramore detailed exposition of the three policyobjectives, sce Volume I of the OLRCRcpFrt,
supranote 38 at 117-146.
41
Ibid. at 211-12.
42
See eg. W.LF. Felstiner,"Avoidance as Dispute Pro cesing: An Elaboration" (1975) 9L L &

Soe'y 695.
43 IY4crv.Pact CoastSaringsCreditUnion, (200 0) S3 B.C.LR. (d) 147 (granting plaintiff iumaty
judgment.)
44 Ciano v York University, [2000] OJ.No. 183 (Sup. Ct.) online: QL (OJ)(granting defendant
summary judgment); [20001 03. No. 3432 (C.A.), online: QL (OJ) (dismissing apfpal of summazy
judgment but alloving appeal on costs decision because plaintiff had raised a novel p~int of lav.).
45 Nadan v. Anjou (Kille), [1993] RJ.Q. 1133 (Qe. C.S.); [1994) RJQ. 1823 (granting
certification); and [19951 A.Q. No. 500 (CA. Qe.), online: QL (JQ).
46 W.L.F. Felstiner, R.L Abel & A. Sarat, "The Emergence and Tranlformation of DMputcs;
Naming, Blaming, Claiming ... "(1931) 15 L & Soc. Rev. 631 (identifyng at least three stages of
dispute transformation: naming the event as an injury or harm; baning someone for causing it;
and
claimingcompensation or restitution).
47
JbN
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to amalgamate claims and match a defendant's ability to make a substantial
investment in the litigation. A class action, it has been said, is a mechanism
for converting even "relatively paltry potential recoveries into something
worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor." 8 Thus, there was a
recommendation to change the Ontario rules governing lawyers, permitting
them to enter into court-approved contingency fee arrangements in class
actions." Other recommendations that also reflect the principle of access
to justice, relating to funding and cost awards, have found their way, to a
greater or lesser extent, into each of the legislative regimes.
The second principle ofjudicial economy is conspicuously in tension
with the first. It is one thing to relieve courts of having to decide similar
claims and experience the juridical awkwardness of reaching inconsistent
results; it is quite another to open them to claims that might otherwise not
have been litigated at all. Too much access can hinder, rather than
promote, judicial economy.50 To the extent that a court invokes the rubric
of legislative intent when making its crucial decision-the decision of
whether a proceeding should be certified as a class action-there is a choice
of which principles to emphasize and where to strike the balance. As things
have turned out, Canadian judges have chosen access as the key principle,
using other rules of court 5' and discretionary powers to guard against the
misuse of judicial resources, rather than relying on judicial economy to
foreclose class actions.52
Behaviour modification is the most pronounced of the three
principles in expressing the normative content that underlies what may
seem, at first, to be a value-free set of rules for the efficient handling of
class disputes. By making modification of wrongful behaviour a policy goal,

48 Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 1997) at 344.
49

Subsequently enacted in O.C.P.A., supra note 30, ss. 32-33.

5o See e.g. Newberg & Conte, supra note 37 (noting strain that class actions can put on court
backlogs); and Nadon v. Anjou, supra note 45 (exemplifying glacial pace of some class actions).
51 The ordinary rules of civil procedure apply to a class action unless stated otherwise in
the
legislation or the procedural rules themselves, or modified by the court pursuant to its discretion in
managing the proceedings. See O.C.P.A., supra note 30, ss. 12, 35; and B.C.C.P.A., supra note 30, ss.
12,40. The same principle is implicit in Quebec, which has incorporated the statutory provisions directly
into the Code of Civil Procedure.
52 Initially, Quebec courts took a strict approach to interpreting the new law, so few cases were
certified as class actions. That has changed dramatically over the years. For commentary on the Quebec
situation, see e.g. Branch, supra note 30 and the special issue of the Quebec Bar Association, (1999) 115
D6veloppements r6cent sur les recours collectifs (Quebec: Yvons Blais, 1999). For annual statistics, see
generally Fonds d'aide aux recours collectifs, RapportAnnuel.
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legislators have gone beyond process fairness to also consider outcome
fairness,53 in particular, fairness to "the little guy." This normative principle
has been manifested with varying degrees of emphasis in different
jurisdictions. One of the more transparent examples of the principle in
action is found in Quebec, where a refusal to certify a proceeding as a class
action can be appealed, while a decision to certify cannot.54 In the class
action context where "certification is everything,"5 the effect on outcome
is palpable.
The OLRC Report borrowed some ideas from neighbouring
jurisdictions, rejected others, and proposed a bill that after a decade of
intensive consultation and revisio 5 6 became the law. British Columbia did
not tarry long; two years after Ontario embraced class actions, it passed its
own ClassProceedingsAct.57
The legislation can thus be seen as exemplifying the rightmost end
of the ADR continuum: dispute processing by decree. In one form or
another, individual claims can be aggregated into a single action by one or
more representative plaintiffs for a hearing on issues common to a defined
class,53 the result of the hearing binding all who do not opt out of the class."
There is a process for certifying the case as a class action" and for giving

53 See eg. Bush, supranote 26; R.G. Bone, "Rethinking the 'Day in Court' Ideal and Nonparty
Preclusion" (1992) 67 N.Y.U. L Rev. 193 (explainingand distmngushingprocsconcnted andoutcme-

oriented theories).
54 QC.C.P, supra note 30, art. 1010.
55 See discussion below.
56
Ontario, Reportof theAttomey GenerarsAdIison,Ccminmtce on Ct2ssActtanRefoerm, (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1990).
57 B.C.C.P.A., supra note

30.

53 While a class action is brought in the name of a representative plaintiff, the trial is on i sues of
law or fact common to the class. See Q.C.C.P., supra note 30, art. 100; O.CPA, supra note 39,s. 5;

and B.C.C.P.A, supra note 30, s. 4. For example, hability, or key aspects of it such as the existence of
a duty of care and its breach, may be certified as common tsues; damages may be left for indivtdual
hearings.
59 Q.C.C.P.,supranote 30, art. 2S4S; O.C.P.A.,supranote 30, s. 27(2); and B.C.CPAqupra
note

30, s. 26.
60

Q.C.C.P.,supranote 30, art. 1002; O.CP.A., supra note 30, s. 2(2); and BC,.P.A,Szpra note

30, s.2(2). The process is started by a motion, typically accompanied by the representative plaintiffs
affidavit and often by affidavits of counsel and experts.
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notice to the class members if it is certified." Ontario, like Quebec, also
provides funding for disbursements, but not legal fees.62 Ontario even
allows a defendants' class proceeding, in which any party to a case can ask
for certification and appointment of a representative defendant. 63
Proceedings are case-managed, that is, a single judge normally hears all
motions. In Quebec and British Columbia, if the proceeding reaches the
stage of a trial on the merits, it will also be heard by a single judge. 64
In deciding whether to certify, the court must consider certain
criteria: if they are met, the legislation says the court must certify. The
criteria in each province are similar:65 (i) the pleadings must disclose a
cause of action; (ii) there is an identifiable class of at least two persons (in
Quebec, natural persons);" (iii) there are common, though not necessarily
identical, issues; (iv) a class action is the preferable procedure for resolving
those issues;67 and (v) there is a representative plaintiff (in Ontario, plaintiff
or defendant) who can fairly represent the class, has a plan for advancing
the action, and has no conflict of interest with the class. Significantly,
courts in Ontario and British Columbia must not refuse to certify the action
as a class proceeding solely because of certain enumerated criteria. Not
surprisingly, the criteria are those the Naken court relied on to find the case

61 Q.C.C.P.,supranote 30, arts. 1006, 1030; O.C.P.A.,supra note 30, ss. 17-22; and
B.C.C.P.A.,
supra note 30, ss. 19-24. If the case is not certified, it can continue as an individual action. There is also
procedure for decertifying a class action if, as the action progresses, the court determines that is
required.
62
Law SocietyAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. L-8, s.59.1-59.5 (establishing the Class Proceedings Fund
and
Law Society Ac Ontario Regulation 771/92 setting out application criteria, levies against awards and
settlements, and administrative provisions).
O.C.P.A., supra note 30, s. 4. Rule 23, supra note 36 has a similar provision. It is
useful, for
example, in patent cases, because the judgment on the patent's scope and validity binds all persons who
have violated the patent.
64 In Ontario, the case management judge can hear the common issues trial only if both
parties
agree: O.C.P.A., supra note 30, s. 34(3). Since, in a complex case,judicial economy is arguably furthered
by having a single judge preside over the whole case, Ontario appears to have leaned in favour of access
to justice (due process) with this provision.
65 What follows is a rough summary of Q.C.C.P., supra note 30, arts. 1003, 1030; O.C.P.A., supra
note 30, s. 5; and B.C.C.P.A., supra note 30, s. 4.
66 Supra note 39.
67 InQuebec, the criterion is that the composition of the group must make the traditional joinder
rules "difficult or impracticable," arguably a stricter test. Q.C.C.P., supra note 30, art. 1003.
68 If there is a conflict between the representative and the class members, the court may
resolve
it by creating subclasses with separate representatives.
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unsuitable for a class action under traditional rules:' 9 (i) damages requiring
individual assessment; (ii) separate contracts involving different class
members; (iii) remedies sought differing among class members; (iv) number
of members or the identity of each unlmown; and (v) existence of a subclass
of members with claims or defences that raise common issues not shared by
all class members.
Certification is typically highly contested. In negotiation parlance,
certification and the accompanying prospect of a trial on the common
issues, can dramatically change the defendant's best alternative to a

negotiated agreement

(BATNA).Y

For instance, in the "Hep C" litigation,71

the federal, provincial and territorial government defendants made no
overtures toward compensating the victims of tainted blood products until
class actions had been certified in British Columbia and Quebec and there
was potential for certification of a national class as a result of the Ontario
proceedings. However, some defendants welcome certification because of
its resjudicata effects, and may seek approval of a so-called "settlement
class" to foreclose or end individual litigation.
IV. BEYOND PROCEDURE: GIVING WITH THE LEFT
If that were all therewas to it-if the legislatures had done no more
than mandate new court procedures-the topic would be rather boring,
except, perhaps, to proceduralists. But there is a great deal more to
consider. The special role given to the courts is one of the aspects that
makes class actions attractive for study in an ADR context. The legislature
may have removed judicial discretion with the right hand-for example, by
stating that certification must follow on fulfilment of some fairly basic
criteria-but it has more than compensated by givingwith the left. Consider
the requirement that a class action must be the preferable procedure for
resolving common issues.' In reality, this gives a judge no small amount of
leeway. Thus, despite the proscription against refusing to certify merely or
solely because of the Naken criteria, judges have said they may consider

69

What follows is a summary of O.C.P.A.,supra note 30,s. 6 and B.C.CP.A.,supra note 30s7.

70 See Fisher & Ury,supra note
7.
71 See eg.note 115.
72

Supra note 65.
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those criteria as part of deciding whether a class action is preferable.' The
preferability touchstone also gives a defendant impetus to devise an
alternative procedure and pitch it as preferable to a class action. For
example, in a defective wood siding case in British Columbia, 74 the
defendant manufacturer offered to set up a voluntary compensation scheme
in Canada. The scheme was patterned on the terms of a settlement reached
in the United States and included abandonment of several defences. The
court saw this as a factor for refusing certification, which it did.
It might seem that a preference ranking of all the alternatives to a
class action is a good thing, something akin to picking the most appropriate
dispute resolution process. Indeed, the Divisional Court took this position
in a case arising out of a Via Rail train accident in southwestern Ontario.75
It said that judges hearing a certification motion must consider all definite
alternative procedures put before them, not just court procedures. This
view opens the door for creativity in devising dispute resolution processes.
But what are the implications for access to justice when a
defendant's private compensation program is used to preempt a class
action? Several, says Garry Watson, a long-time participant in and observer
of the class action scene.76 One implication is the loss of notice provisions
and court supervision of claims administration. Another is the possibility,
some would say likelihood, of class members having to accept less in
damages than they would be entitled to at common law. Of course, good
process design can meet both objections: defendants can propose their own
means of notification, and in some cases, they might willingly refund the
total amounts owing to consumers, especially where the amounts are easy
to calculate, as with bank or utility overcharges.
More fundamental, however, is Watson's argument concerning the
potential for casting a long-run chill over the willingness of class counsel to
launch cases. Judges have acknowledged the litigation risk incurred by
plaintiffs' lawyers when making decisions on class counsel fees, as they are

73 There has been a debate on the correctness of the approach. See the summary and attempt at
resolution in Bywater v. Toronto TransitCommission (1998), 27 C.P.C. (4th) 172 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
74
Bittnerv. Louisiana-PacificCorp. (1997), 43 B.C.L.R. (3d) 324 (Sup.
Ct.).
75
Binner v. Via Rail Canada Inc. (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 793 (Div. Ct.) (denying motion to compel
plaintiffs to answer defendant's questions about plaintiffs' opinion on proposed alternative procedure);
(2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 114 (Sup. Ct.) (approving certification) [hereinafter Via Rail cited to Sup. Ct.].
76 G. Watson, "Annual Survey of Recent Developments in Civil Procedure," in Ontario
Civil
Practice2001 (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 2000) at 2: Survey-13.
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required to do under the legislation 7 That mechanism, or incentive, is
imperilled when a court denies certification on the basis that a defendant's
dispute resolution scheme is preferable to a class action. Paradoxically,
plaintiffs' lawyers may find that after logging much time, effort, and
expense in bringing a class action, they are able to elicit a compensation
offer for the class. The offer is typically one that was not forthcoming
before the action began. However, the lawyers for the plaintiff risk going
uncompensated themselves because the offer is made in the context of an
alternative proposal to a class action. This scenario is not promising for
access to justice. The answer, says Watson, is to make the defendant's
scheme part of the framework for a settlement of the class action, which, as
discussed below, is also subject to court approval.
In practice, these potential roadblocks to consumer redress have not
yet manifested to any great extent. Canadian courts have generally leaned
towards certification: the odds of a case being certified are roughly two to
one in favour of certification.7S Consider how the case management judge
applied the Divisional Court's opinion in the Via Rail certification hearing.
Via Rail had proposed a two-stage process as an alternative to a class
action: (i) it would pay each passenger $1,000 in exchange for a release; and
(ii) passengers wanting more would provide claim particulars (including
claims of family members) and efforts would be made to reach settlement,
failing which the claims would be arbitrated, with Via Rail paying the costs.
On revieving this proposal, Justice Brockenshire concluded that it
was not a definite alternative, as specified by the Divisional Court. First, it
was unclear to him how he could make an order that might require nonparties to attend arbitration, especially without giving them notice and an
opportunity to be heard. 9 Second, the proposal provided no means for
resolving potential conflicts between family members or between family

77 O.C.P.A., supra note 30,s. 32(2); B.C.C.P.A., supra note 30, s. 3S(2). Quebec has no -s-cific
provision dealing v.ith fee approval, but the authority to do so comes through the asa.ment of
statutory charges against a class award, one such charge being the fees of class couns-el. See Q.C.CP.,
supra note 30, art. 1035(2). The leading Canadian case on class counsel fees is Gam-e v. Sdcarp Ltd.
(1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 417 (CA.) [hereinafter Gagne).
7S Calculations performed by the author are from tables in Branch, supra note 30 at APP-I and
Eizenga, supra note 30 at Tables.3. The percentages of certified cases (some of whieh may have been
on consent) were as follows: Quebec, 59%; Ontario, 781%; British Columbia, 67%, fora simpe average
of 6S%.
79 Ilia Rail, sqpra note 75 at 118. Implicit here is the notion that the court could have made such
orders as part of a settlement agreement on certification, because that process contemplates giving
notice to class members and inviting their participation in the approval process (sac dis:cuszon below
on objectors.)
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members and the passenger representing them.8" In the end, Justice
Brockenshire concluded that certifying a class action was simpler and more
straightforward. In another recent case, this time involving weight loss
drugs,8" the courts have further curbed the ability of defendants to invoke
the preferability argument by stressing that a preferable procedure really
has two aspects: first, it must be a fair and efficient way of determining the
common issues; second, it must advance the three policy objectives of the
legislation.8 2 In other words, unless a defendant can show that its procedure
will enhance access to justice, promote judicial economy, and go some way
towards modifying its own alleged or admitted wrongful behaviour, the
procedure will not likely be seen as preferable.
On a more general level, the legislation gives courts much discretion
in managing the conduct of proceedings and frees them to employ
simplified forms of proof and alternative remedies. For instance, the court
may require the cost of notice to the class to be paid by the plaintiff or the
defendant, or order that it be apportioned between them. Given that costs
of notifying a national class 84 can run into the hundreds of thousands of
dollars, this aspect of class proceedings alone can influence the various
decision points in bringing, prosecuting, defending, and settling a class
action. In a similar vein, the court may, after determining the common
issues, take various approaches to determine individual entitlement to
relief, including referral to independent experts, individual damages
hearings, or global awards apportioned according to some formula.85 The
legislation takes the innovative step of authorizing the court to "admit as
evidence statistical information that would not otherwise be admissible as

80

Ibid. at 119.
81 Wilson v. Servier Canada Inc. (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 219 (Sup. Ct.) (granting certification)

[hereinafter Wdson].
82

Ibid, at 249-50.

83

O.C.P.A., supra note 30, s.22; B.C.C.P.A., supra note 30, s. 24. In Quebec, the cost of notice is

a first charge on an award or settlement fund. See Q.C.C.P., supra note 30, art. 1035.

84 Quebec and Ontario do not expressly deal with the concept of nation-wide or, for that matter,
world-wide classes. Courts in both provinces have allowed them, with Ontario taking the most liberal

approach, by authorizing them on an opt-out basis without any residency requirement, former or
present. For treatment of the issue, including a discussion of the case law, see Wilson, supra note 81.
British Columbia authorizes extra-provincial subclasses on an opt-in basis, but requires the subclass to
have its own representative: See B.C.C.P.A., supra note 30, ss. 6(l), 6(2), 8(1)(g), 16(2), 16(4), and

16(5).
85

Q.C.C.P.,supra note 30, arts. 1030-40; O.C.P.A.,supra note 30, ss. 24-26; and B.C.C.P.A.,supra

note 30, ss. 27-34.
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evidence, including information derived from sampling"' for the purposes
of distributing an aggregate award. The evidence must be compiled in
accordance with generally accepted statistical principles, and related
provisions are designed to guard against statistical abuse and 'junk
science." While, to some, such provisions may have a "surrealistic cast,"
the bottom line is that statistical methods are available to provide group
relief where individual entitlements would be too difficult or expensive to
ascertain. Courts can be expected to increasingly use those methods as their
comfort with them grows.
V.

THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN APPROVING SETTLEMENTS:
REINVENTING SOLOMON

As already noted, a consideration in negotiating civil disputes is the
ability to keep settlement outcomes confidential. But that consideration
plays little or no role in class actions, because settlement, discontinuance,
or abandonment of a class action must be approved by the court to ensure
that the interests of absent class member are met." This aspect of the
court's oversight and discretion is probably one of the most important
features setting class actions apart from ordinary litigation. It makes the
class action a distinctly hybrid process. Settlement talks are instigated by
commencement of a class action, a legislated dispute resolution mechanism.
The talks are conducted at the private, consensual end of the spectrum. But
everyone must return to court-a shift back to the command end of the
spectrum-to get a judge's imprimatur on any negotiated agreement. The
closest analogy is a settlement made on behalf of an infant or a person with
a legal disability, the key difference being that a class settlement can affect
the rights and remedies of thousands.

86 O.C.P.A., supra note 30, s. 23(1); and B.C.CP.A., supranote 30, s.3(1).
87

Inre FibreboardCorp., 893 F.2d 706 at 710 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting trial
court's first attempt
to collectively determine damages to a class of asbestos plaintiffs).
8S Q.C.C.P.,supra note 30, arts. 1016,1025; OC P.A ,,upra note 30,s 29,; and B.C.C.P.A,.vupra

note 30, s. 35. The B.C. statute, however, has a wrinlde that allows actions to ha ettled on an individual
basis before certification, ostensibly without court approal. This anes from the term "clas
proceeding" in s. 35, in turn defined as "a proceeding certified as a class proceeding" (s.
1) Sce W.I.

Branch and J.C. WIeefeld, "Settling a Class Action (or How to Vresctle an Octopusy' (Canadian
Institute Conference on Litigating Toic Torts and Other Mass \Vrong ZUJ) (Torontom Canadian
Institute,2000) atTabXVI: 8-10.If a pre-certification settlementwith the representative can shut dwn
a class action vdthout the need for court approval, is there not a risk that the legiclation's pahcy gals
will go unfulfilled? Compare O.C.P.A., supra note 30, s. 29(1) referring to "a proceeding commenced

under this Act and a proceeding certified as a class proceeding."
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Thus, when asking the question "an alternative to what?" the
answer becomes, in part, an alternative to the public/private bifurcation of
disputes that has long vexed ADR scholars. Owen Fiss kicked off the debate
in a provocative article in the mid-1980s,8 9 sounding a caution in response
to what he heard as a siren call to ADR on the part of the judiciary.
Professor Fiss saw justice as a public good. He thought private settlements
often disadvantaged marginalized groups and bought temporary peace
instead of vindicating legal rights. 9' While Fiss was chiefly concerned with
public law decisions involving constitutional or human rights, even so-called
private disputes have a public character-as anyone who has overheard a
marital row will attest. Ergo, their settlement is coloured with a public
interest. 91

The legislative scheme thus has the potential to render moot some
of the private/public debate by removing class settlements from the purely
private realm and placing them in the quasi-public realm. Yet despite this
potential, class actions have been criticized, with the harshest criticism
aimed at settlements.' Critics have targeted both "sweetheart" and
"blackmail" deals. In the former, class counsel purportedly collude with
defendants, settling meritorious claims for much less than their value. 9 In

89

O.M. Fiss, "Against Settlement" (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073.

90 See also D. Luban, "Settlements and the Erosion of the PublicRealm" (1995) 83 Geo.
LJ. 2619
(questioning whether the public interest is addressed in settlements, even in court approval of class
action settlements). But see A. McThenia & T. Shaffer, "For Reconciliation"(1985) 94 Yale LJ. 166
(arguing that settlement incorporates community values).
91 Compare J. Frank's critique: "If a man's pocket is picked, the government brings a criminal suit,
and accepts responsibility for its prosecution. If a man loses his life's savings through a breach of
contract, the government accepts no such responsibility. Shouldn't the government perhaps assume
some of the burden of enforcing what we call private rights?" J. Frank, Courts on Trial (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1949) cited in E. London, ed., The World ofLaw: TheLawas Literature(New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1960) at 747.
92 There is a vast literature and vociferous debate in the United States on this topic. See e.g.
Newberg & Conte, supra note 37; Mass Torts and Class Action Lawsuits: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on CourtsandIntellectualPropertyof the Committee on the Judiciary,United States House
of Representatives, 105th Congress, Second Session, March 5, 1998, Serial No. 141 (Washington, DC:
United States Government Printing Office); and D.R. Hensler et al., ClassActionDilemmas: Pursuing
Public Goalsfor PrivateGain (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 2000) [hereinafter
Rand Study]. The Rand Study comprises three years of empirical research on ten representative cases,
all of which settled. It is essential reading for anyone interested in class action research, policy and
legislative reform.
93
See ibid.;B. Hay, "Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little" (1997)
48 Hastings L.J. 479 (asserting that danger of suboptimal settlements can be greatly reduced by
appropriate judicial regulation of class counsel fees); and "Note--Class Backwards: Does the Fairness,
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the latter, they allegedly bring claims with little merit yet extract settlements
for more than the claims are worth.9 Both types of settlements create the
danger of abuse by lawyers: in sweetheart deals, at the expense of the class;
in blackmail suits, at the expense of defendants averse to the cost, risk or
timing of litigation. Of course, both problems are hardly unique to class
actions and may be overstated9 But the danger exists, and the intent is
clearly to minimize it by subjecting settlements to scrutiny in the public
forum of the courts.
Are courts up to the task? In an adversarial system, effective dispute
resolution is premised on the concept of zealous partisans advocating their
best opposing arguments to the judge, who in turn picks the most
persuasive ones, or perhaps more accurately, the ones that best accord with
the judge's view of the facts, the law, and the application of one to the
other. Whatever the merits of that concept, it is absent when a high-stakes,
intensively negotiated settlement is jointly presented to the court for
approval. Would Solomon have been as wise had the two harlots simply
presented him with a settlement agreement on how to divide the contested
baby? 9 One suspects he would have needed some assistance.

Class action legislation, however, provides little assistance to
valuing settlements. Quebec and Ontario set out information that must be
provided on the approval application, such as the method and cost of
distributing funds to class members; amounts to be paid as costs or fees; any
levy owing to a government funding agency; and, if a balance is likely to

Adequacy and Reasonableness of a Negotiated Class Action Settlement Really Have Any Effect on
Approval? General Motors v. Bloyed 916 SAV. 2d 949 (Tex. 1996)" (1997) 2, Tes* Tech. L Rev. 159
([hereinafter Case Comment] criticizing in-kind, that is, non-cash, settlements that result in windfall
profits for defendants and insufficient compensation for plaintiffs).
See Epstein %FirstllfaradhnInc. (2000), 2 B.LR. (3d) 30 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (castigating
"striko
suits ... filed solely for their settlement value" and refusing to approve either a propased settlement or
counsel fee); and J.C. Alexander, "Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Security Class
Actions" (1991) 43 Stan. L Rev. 497 (empirical study concluding that a significant number of
settlements in securities cases, alleging such things as prospectus misrepresentations, are not voluntary
in that trial is not a viable alternative, and are not accurate in that the strength of the case on the merits
has little or nothing to do with the settlement amount).
95
See B.L Hay& D. Rosenberg, "Sweetheart and Blaekmail Settlements in ClassActions: Reality
and Remedy" (2000) 75 Notre Dame L Rev. 1377 (noting that critics generally base concerns on
egregious anecdotes, not empirical studies, and concluding that concerns can be handled through
judicial safeguardswithout resorting to the drastic remedy of reducing availability of class actions). For
empirical analysis reaching the same general conclusion, see Rand Study, s.upra note 92.
96 The Ho4, Bible (New York. World Publishing Company, 1960) at I Kings 3:16-23. OQuaere
v~hether Solomon's order to cut baby in half, knowing full v.ell that the true mother v.ould protest and
thereby reveal herself, w s an interest-based or a rights-based solution.
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remain after class members' claims are satisfied, how it will be distributed.97
Beyond this, the information requirement is basically left to the courts'
discretion. A Canadian judge who has culled the case law has found no less
than sixteen factors that should be considered and eighteen types of
information that should be provided, 98 all to satisfy a fairly elastic test,
namely, that the settlement must be fair, reasonable, and in the best interest
of the class as a whole. 99
One way for courts to get more information about settlement
quality is to give a surrogate adversarial role to objectors-class members
who dislike a proposed settlement and are willing to work up a case as to
why they dislike it and howit could be improved. 1'0 The concept is probably
a good one, though in Canada, few objectors ever come forward, perhaps
out of apathy, or perhaps because Canadian settlements are generally good.
In the leading Canadian case on the role of objectors, 10 one of several
"vanishing premium" actions against life insurance companies, the plaintiffs
alleged that the life insurance company or its sales agents promised that
investment returns from policyholder premiums would, after a number of
years, pay for the premiums. The alleged promises did not materialize. The
parties reached a settlement after ten months of negotiations and presented
it to the court for approval. Fourteen objectors out of a very large class
were given extensive participation rights, but their input does not seem to
have been very helpful. After listening to three days of objector crossexamination on affidavits filed in support of the settlement, the court
approved the agreement, concluding that while class action settlements
should be "viewed with some suspicion,"'02 all settlements are "a product
of compromise ...[f]airness is not a standard of perfection."'"° Among

97Rules of Practiceof SuperiorCourtof Quebec in Civil Matters, R.S.Q., c. C-25, r. 63; Rules
of Civil
Procedure,R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R.12.05, as am. by O.Reg. 457/01.
98 See Honourable Mr. Justice Frank Maczko, Class Proceedings Act: Annotated looseleaf
(Vancouver: Continuing Legal Education Society of B.C., 2000) at 82-85.
99
Dabbs v. Sun LifeAssurance Co. of Canada, [1998140 O.R. (3d) 429 (Gen Div) (certification and
settlement approval) [hereinafter Dabbs].
100 Authority to do so derives from O.C.P.A., supra note 30, s. 14 and B.C.C.P.A., supra note 30,
s.15, permitting class members to take part in the proceeding on terms the court considers appropriate.
See also Q.C.C.P.,supra note 30, arts. 1017-18.
101 Dabbs,supra note 99.
102 G. Watson, "Is the Price Still Right? Class Proceedings in Ontario" (C.I.A.J. conference,
Toronto, October, 1997) quoted in Ibid. at 440.
103
Dabbs,supra note 99 at 440.
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other things, the court considered the high reputation of class counsel who
had negotiated the agreement; the agreement's use of opt-out clauses and
a sophisticated alternative claims approval process for different categories
of class members that varied with the cogency of the proof available;" and
the fact that British Columbia and Quebec courts had approved essentially

the same agreement.10 But Justice Sharpe, as he then was, also took an

active role in the settlement hearing, questioning expert witnesses and
counsel for both parties to be satisfied that class interests were being
protected. Not all judges may be so inclined to assume an unaccustomed
role; certainly, all could benefit from more empirical research on settlement

quality, particular "intraspecies"

comparisons of class settlements. In this

regard, a Canadian counterpart to the Rand Study's in-depth review of ten
American class actions'0 would be a valuable tool that, hopefully, ill make
it onto the research agenda in the near future.
VI. DOLLARS AND SENSITIVITY: TOWARDS A CALCULUS
OF CLASS DISPUTING
No discussion of a dispute resolution mechanism vould be complete
without reference to the total societal costs incurred in relation to total
societal benefits achieved. This approach would compare the net social
benefits derived from different mechanisms to form conclusions about the
advantages of one method over another. Class actions could thereby be
compared to avoidance, traditional litigation, and other forms of ADR.

104Forexample, ifa class member could point to an agcnt'svwntten representation about
hij.. fast
the premium would "vanish," the insurance company vould honour that representation. An vral
representation vould have to be proved by affidavit, vith the agent confirming the reprscentation, for
a class member to also get full compensation. The compensation descended from there into three
further categories of proof, w.hich, as the court recognized, v.as an innoatnic ray to incorrolrate the
notion of litigation risk into a settlement agreement.
105See Romandzuk v Sun Life4ssurance Company of Canada (28 Nowember lf#97), Vancouer
C96424S (B.C.S.C.) and Podmorev. Sun Life du Canada,cie dlassurancc-ize, [19331 AQ. No Mt(CS )
online: QL QJQ). Does the fact of an agreement's approval in one province tell us much about vhether
it should be approved in another? One would hope that not too much %eight ,ould be put on this
factor, lest it promote a 'rush to settlement' in the jurisdiction percei',ed to be most fawourably dtrF':d
to bringing a complex case to conclusion.
106 See Galanter & Cahill,supranote 10 (notingariousv:aysofcompanng'ettlcment outcames)
107 Rand Study, supra note 92.
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Would that it were so easy. Calculating the benefits and costs ofjust
ten class actions has proved to be "enormously difficult""~ if one considers
the challenges of a societal evaluation. Aside from study design problems
such as sampling, control groups, and multicollinearity of variables,"° there
is the basic problem of what to measure."' At least with class actions, three
explicit benchmarks have been provided to guide evaluators: access to
justice, judicial economy, and behaviour modification. But as mentioned,
access to justice can be defined in various ways, for instance, by process,
outcome, or a mix of the two."' Similarly, judicial economy may be as

roguish and uncertain a measure as the proverbial Chancellor's foot." 2
As to behaviour modification, a host of questions arises. For
example, whose behaviour needs changing? It is widely thought that class
actions are aimed at corporations; indeed, one sees the term behaviour
modification itself modified into corporate behaviour modification. Yet one
of the remarkable things about the Canadian class action experience is that
government and institutional defendants have been prime targets. At least
this is the situation in Canada, where the major defendants have been the
federal and provincial governments, both in terms of repeat litigation and
amount of relief sought." 3 Even if we can readily ascertain whose behaviour
needs changing, how can we tell whether a particular class action, or
perhaps an accumulation of them, caused a change? And if we are able to
make the causal link, how do we measure the impacts on social welfare?
These are difficult questions, but we must try to answer them if we ever
want to ascertain how well the class action experiment is working.

1 08

ibid at 23.

109 See e.g. Macfarlane, supra note 28 at 675ff. For example, consider the problems in controlling
for legislative differences when evaluating certification costs in a cross-jurisdictional case.
110 See Macfarlane, ibid.; Galanter & Cahill, supra note 10.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
112The reference is to John Selden's description of equity in S.W. Singer, The Table-Talk of John
Selfen with a Biographical Preface and Notes, 3d ed. (London: John Russell Smith, 1860) at 49: "Equity
is a Roguish thing. For Law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according the Conscience
of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make
the Standard for the measure, we call a Foot; a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain Measure would this
be? One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a Third an indifferent Foot: 'Tis the same thing
in the Chancellor's conscience." For a critical examination of how this metaphor has been adopted in
Canadian law, see D.R. Klinck & L Mirella, "Tracing the Imprint of the Chancellor's Foot in
Contemporary Canadian Judicial Discourse"(1998) 13 Can. J. L & Soc'y 63.
See Branch, supra note 30 at APP-1 and Eizenga, supra note 30 at Tables.3.
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We can say a few things with certainty on the cost side. Class actions
are expensive. Consider the big ticket item of class counsel fees. There is
sensitivity on that point in the United States, where cries of "profiteering"
are strident, regular, and occasionally accurate. It would be wrong to say
that profiteering is widespread," 4 but when plaintiffs' lawyers earn nine
million U.S. dollars for a settlement that gives each class member no more
than a coupon of dubious value, class actions get bad press.' Class counsel
fees have also become a sensitive issue in Canada, after the approval of a
52.5 million dollar fee award following a pan-Canadian settlement of the
"Hep C" class action." 6 Of course, it should not be the absolute fee level
that matters, but the level relative to the risks taken, work done, and results
obtained. 17 In that regard, the "Hep C" fees cannot be faulted: approving
courts found that on any basis of comparison, class counsel fees were more
than reasonable."' The defendants' legal fees rarely get press at all." 9 Some
idea of the substantial cost of defending class actions can be found in the
Rand Study, where three of the defendants shared information on outside
counsel costs. For those three defendants, the costs were 20 per cent. 40 per
cent, and 100 per cent of class counsel fees, respectively."' If other
transaction costs associated with class certification and settlement such as
the costs of using expert witnesses, providing notice to class members, and
the administration of individual claims were added to the class counsel fees,

114 See Rand Study, supra note 92 at 20-23 (noting considerable variation in attorney
fee aw'ards
but finding them to be generally a "modest" share of negotiated settlements ranging from 5 to SO pr
cent of total settlement value, but with majority amounting to less than one third of settlement alue),
See Case Comment, supranote 93.
116 In Quebec, see Honfwn v. Canada (PracurcurgZni&alh[19991 LQ. No, 4370 (C S.), online (QL)
(JQ), (settlement approval); [2000] J.Q. No. 3S99 (C.S.), online QL (JQ) (fee approval). In Ontario, "_e
Parsonsv. CanadianRed Cross Socict) [1999] OJ. No. 3572 (Sup. CL), online: QL (OJ), (sattlament

approv-al); [2000149 O.R. (3d) 281 (Sup. Ct.) (fee approval). In British ColumbiaseEn,,can , Caradan
Red Cross Socie4; [199 9 J6S B.C.LR. (3d) 350 (S.C.) settlement approval); [
BcJ. No. 1254 (S.C.),
online: QL (BCJ) (fee approval).
117 See Gagne,supranote 77.
118 For instance, the total compensation for class members vas around 1.5 billion
dollars. putting
the fee avwards at approximately 2 per cent of the total recovery, an amount that compared w.ry
favourably with the 15-26 per cent range found in the other major Canadian fee approvals that the
courts reviewed.
119 Unless, for example, the defendant is the government and must relea the information

pursuant to an access request or the political e.xigencies of the day.
120 Rand Study, supra note 92 at 20, fn 9.
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it is clear that processing disputes in the form of class actions carries a high
price tag.
On the benefit side, it seems incontestable that class actions have
enhanced access to justice, both in terms of process and outcome. The
vanishing insurance premium cases exemplify this. Some 400,000 Sun Life
policyholders across Canada achieved redress through a settlement that,
roughly, took their individual circumstances into account. Among other
things, the settlement's use of opting out provisions and an alternative
claims resolution procesS-ADR within class proceedings, as it were- make
it a model for how both rights and interests can be addressed within a class
action framework.1 2' The case also achieved judicial economy: had even a
fraction of the 400,000 policyholders named, blamed, and claimed through
individual litigation, their cases would have clogged the court system for
years. Whether anyone's behaviour was modified as a result of the class
litigation would require us to pry into corporate boardrooms and kitchen
table conversations between agents and their prospects. Truly, only time
will tell.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
At first blush, situating class actions within the world of ADR may
seem an awkward thing to do, especially from a viewpoint in which
litigation is the other and ADR, everything else. On closer inspection-and
on taking a broader and more rigorous view of ADR that consistently, even
naggingly, asks "an alternative to what?"-class actions fit rather well. By
aggregating the common disputes of hundreds, thousands, or hundreds of
thousands of persons, and by processing and resolving them in a forum that
attempts to incorporate society's private and public values, class actions
offer a unique alternative to tolerating wrongful behaviour and to litigating
it in the traditional sense. Furthermore, finding a niche for something in
any theoretical framework cannot help but have an effect on the framework
itself. For class actions, the effect is probably greatest in the area of
settlement-something that ADR is vitally concerned with. As suggested
here, class settlements are ripe for a rich and detailed case study; the fact
that they are in the public domain makes them unique. While this aspect
of class actions responds to the private/public debate, it also raises the

121 There have recently been settlements with other life insurance companies that have built on
the Dabbs model. Some are fighting certification or defending on the basis that they did not authorize
their agents to make the alleged representations.
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debate afresh. Why, after all, should a class settlement be public; a private
one, not? And if indivduals-not class actors-knew that they too would
be subject to public scrutiny when settling a case, how might that transform
indidual disputes? But those are questions that will have to be left for
builders of the future. This tentative exploration, this tinkering and
quarrying and hewing, vl have achieved some modest success if it leaves
a few bricks, perhaps the rudiments of a foundation, for those builders.

